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statements of the sixth hypothesis suffices to show that what we have is the second *Clouds* as Aristophanes planned to present it when (sometime after 421 B.C.) he wrote its parabasis. That is a conclusion very different from, e.g., the one reached by Navarre, *Revue des études anciennes*, XIII (1911), 280: *notre texte actuel est, en maints endroits, un amalgame de deux rédactions divergentes, parfois même inconciliables.*

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DESERTIONS FROM THE "TEN THOUSAND"

There is a very considerable numerical difference between the total Greek forces mobilized by Cyrus and those that participated in the battle of Cunaxa. By the time Cyrus reached Celenae nine generals had joined him.¹ The sum of their fourteen contingents of hoplites and light troops amounted to 12,900. But the result of an official enumeration of the combined forces was 13,000 (i. 2. 9). There is no occasion for surprise at this relatively trifling divergence. The sum of fourteen contingents estimated in even hundreds was bound to be different from the number of the assembled troops in two divisions also given in even hundreds.² In the mountains of Cilicia, Menon lost 100 men (i. 2. 25). At Issus 400 Greek deserters from Abrocomas and 700 hoplites under Chirisophus joined Cyrus (i. 4. 3). Thus between Sardis and Issus about 14,000 Greeks were mobilized. On the eve of the battle of Cunaxa there were only 12,900 (i. 7. 10). There is a difference of over 1,000 men. What became of them? Xenophon mentions only two deserters, Zenias and Pasion. These disgruntled generals secured a ship and sailed away from Myriandus (i. 4. 7). Their original contingents aggregated 4,600, but over 2,000 had gone over to Clearchus at Issus. There is no indication that any part of their forces went with them. Indeed, the whole incident is represented as a personal grievance in which the soldiers would have no interest. Neubert (*De Xenophontis Anabasi*) would eliminate both the official enumerations (i. 2. 9; i. 7. 10), and the second mention of Sophaenetes (i. 2. 9) with 1,000 men, as interpolations. This drastic method of disposing of a difficulty has found no favor with editors of the *Anabasis*, and deservedly so.

¹ Sophaenetes is mentioned twice (i. 2. 3 and 9). Various explanations have been offered. There were two generals called Sophaenetes; the second mention is a repetition—the size of the contingent in both cases is the same, 1,000 hoplites; it is a copyist's error for Agias or Cleanor. An account of the expedition was composed by Sophaenetes. It was probably the ultimate source of Diodorus.

² The use of εἰς, ὥς, and ἀμφὶ is a further indication that the numbers are inaccurate.

Cousin¹ cites a statement of Suidas to the effect that desertions from the army of Cyrus amounted to 3,900. The passage in part is as follows:

ὁ δὲ [i.e., Cyrus]. ὡς Τισσαφέρνει πολεμῶν, ἤθροισε δύναμιν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐγνω στρατεύειν. τετρακόσιοι δὲ κατέλιπον τὸν Κῦρον καὶ ἔφυγον ἐκ τῶν συστρατευσάντων ὀπλίται καὶ πελτασταὶ γφ'. Ξενοφῶν δὲ συνανέβη. . . . δέκα οὖν βαρβάρων μυριάδας συναθροίσας ὡς ἐπὶ Πισίδας δῆθεν ἐπορεύετο. ὡς δὲ τὰ ἔθνη διῆλθεν, ἐφ' ᾧ στρατεύειν προεφασίζετο, συνέντες οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐπὶ βασιλέα τὴν στρατείαν ὥκουν τὴν ἀνάβασιν καὶ Ξενοφῶν αὐτῶν στρατηγῇ καὶ πάντα νικᾷ. ἐλθόντες δὲ καὶ εἰς Θράκην ἐμίσθωσαν ἑαυτοὺς Σεύθῃ τῷ βασιλεῖ μῦριοι διασωθέντες [s.v. Ξενοφῶν].

Cousin characterizes this information as "un détail important (3,900 hommes quittant une armée de 10,000 environ) dont Xenophon n'a pas parlé." But his conclusion that the total forces enlisted by Cyrus amounted to between 16,800 and 17,900, figures utterly at variance with the estimates of Xenophon, arouses incredulity.² The words, *τετρακόσιοι δὲ κατέλιπον τὸν Κῦρον, καὶ ἔφυγον ἐκ τῶν συστρατευσάντων ὀπλίται καὶ πελτασταὶ γφ'*, do not mean that 3,900 deserted the army before Cunaxa. Suidas has carelessly joined together two groups that deserted at different stages of the expedition. The 3,500 men are those who deserted after Cunaxa. The words *κατέλιπον τὸν Κῦρον* and *ἔφυγον ἐκ τῶν συστρατευσάντων* are intended to differentiate the groups. The one deserted Cyrus, the other their fellow-soldiers.

It is not strictly true to say, as Cousin does, that Xenophon takes no account of these desertions. When he introduces himself after the death of the generals and explains how he came to join the expedition and continue with it after its real objective was disclosed he says: *ἐπεὶ μέντοι εἰς Κιλικίαν ἦλθον, σαφὲς πᾶσιν ἦδη ἐδόκει εἶναι ὅτι ὁ στόλος εἴη ἐπὶ βασιλέα. φοβούμενοι δὲ τὴν ὁδὸν καὶ ἄκοντες ὁμῶς οἱ πολλοὶ δι' αἰσχύνην καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ Κύρου συνηκολούθησαν. ὧν εἰς καὶ Ξενοφῶν ἦν* (iii. 1. 10). The implication of *οἱ πολλοί* is that a considerable number did not feel that they were bound in honor to continue their connection with the expedition after discovering that they had been deceived. Under the circumstances it would be surprising if there were no desertions from the ranks. A dangerous mutiny occurred at Tarsus when Clearchus ordered his troops to advance (i. 3. 1). Their discipline had in all probability suffered in the sack of the city a few days before. Cyrus settled the difficulty by promising increased pay without disclosing his real objective. But suspicion was rife that the expedition was against the king. And dissatisfied soldiers had abundant opportunities at the busy ports of

¹ Kyros, *Le jeune en Asie Mineure*, p. 148.

² *Ibid.*, p. 149: "Si vraiment 3,900 hommes abandonnèrent l'armée, étant donné que, à Kounaxa, le nombre des combattants fut de 12,900, l'armée grecque aurait donc à un moment atteint le chiffre de 16,800. Si l'on prend le chiffre de 13,800 combattants (nombre à Issos) on voit qu'il y aurait eu 17,900 Grecs," etc.

Issus and Myriandrus to slip away by sea. Twelve days were spent at these ports. Quite likely the desertions were scattered over the six weeks that elapsed between their arrival in Cilicia and their departure inland from Myriandrus.

The number 400 does not correspond to the difference (900 to 1,000) between the total at Issus and that at Cunaxa. But there is no serious objection to our regarding these figures as covering the same losses. Desertions from a force divided into a number of different contingents without any centralized control could be ascertained only by an inspection of the various muster- or pay-rolls. And it was to Cyrus' interest not to disclose facts that would tend to lower the morale of the Greek troops. Suidas' source erred on the side of conservatism. The figures drawn from Xenophon are more reliable.

It is idle to inquire why Xenophon does not explicitly mention desertions. Perhaps he feared that they would detract from the reputation of Clearchus and Cyrus, whom he greatly admired. Up to the battle of Cunaxa everything is presented in the most favorable light.

The estimate of 3,500 desertions between Cunaxa and Thrace is excessive. It is not likely that many desertions occurred between Cunaxa and Trebizond, though some are recorded.¹ At Trebizond the situation changed. It was easy to take ship from, or settle down in, the various Greek cities along the coast of the Pontus. Accordingly, an effort was made to prevent the disintegration of the army before it reached Greece (iii. 3. 5). At Trebizond there were 9,800; and 6,000 took service under Seuthes. The difference may be accounted for as follows: casualties, 700; 400 sold as slaves by Aristarchus; 2,700 deserters.² These figures are all drawn from Xenophon's narrative. Though he nowhere estimates the number of the deserters, he refers to the gradual dispersion of the army (vii. 2. 3), and mentions individual deserters like Silamus, Dexippus, and the companions of Clearetus (v. 7. 14).

The main source of Suidas is Xenophon. But his figures are drawn from some other account, possibly that of Sphaenetus. The statement that 10,000 reached Thrace in safety is clearly wrong. Suidas may have carelessly assumed that the common designation *μύριοι* bore some relation to the number that succeeded in reaching Greece. The history of the 10,000 can be carried down to the battle of Coronea in 394.³ The strength of the force cannot be estimated after 5,000 entered the service of the Spartans under Thibron (Diodorus xiv. 37). By following their history far enough one could reach a point at which the desertions amounted to 3,500. But the account of Suidas ends with their arrival in Thrace.

¹ The desertion of 340 Thracians, including all the cavalry, is mentioned (xi. 2. 7).

² Cousin, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

³ Cf. Bonner, "Xenophon's Comrades in Arms," *Classical Journal*, X, 195.

The importance of Suidas' information regarding the deserters from the army of Cyrus is slight. It draws attention to a situation which, though implied in the *Anabasis*, has escaped the notice of the editors. The marked difference between the estimates of numbers would seem to indicate that the deserters did not leave the army in a body at one time, though the bulk of them were doubtless encouraged by the example of Zenias and Pasion to desert at Myriandrus.

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NOTE ON HERODOTUS 1. 60

Herodotus' indignant and spluttering protest against the foolishness that staged the home-coming of Peisistratus under the guidance of an impersonated Athena is one of the best-known and most frequently quoted passages of the *Histories*:

Ἐνδεξαμένον δὲ τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁμολογήσαντος ἐπὶ τούτοις Πεισιστράτου μηχανῶνται δὴ ἐπὶ τῇ κατόδῳ πρῆγμα εὐθέστατον, ὥς ἐγὼ εὐρίσκω, μακρῷ, ἐπεὶ γε ἀπεκρίθη ἐκ παλαιτέρου τοῦ βαρβάρου ἔθνεος τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐὼν καὶ δεξιώτερον καὶ εὐθής ἡλιθίου ἀπηλλαγμένον μᾶλλον, εἰ καὶ τότε γε οὔτοι ἐν Ἀθηναίοις τοῖσι πρώτοις λεγομένοις εἶναι Ἑλλήνων σοφίην μηχανῶνται τοιαῦδε.

The expression of Herodotus' argumentative disgust, manifested by the repetition of *γε*, is slightly anacoluthic and will not construe smoothly. It must be felt in the Greek words in the Greek order. He begins by saying that he takes it to be the "silliest thing ever." The *ἐπεὶ γε* clause might have served as the sole reason or justification of that statement. It was an imbecile proceeding to "put such a thing over" on a Greek population, because the Greeks had from of old been distinguished from the barbarians as cleverer and more free from that kind of foolish simple-mindedness. That isn't strong enough to satisfy Herodotus' feeling. He adds the a fortiori argument that the trick was tried on the Athenians, the most intelligent of the Greeks. And this introduced by *εἰ . . . γε* becomes in accordance with Greek and Herodotean usage of *εἰ . . . γε* the main confirmation of the preceding *εὐθέστατον*, and so the *ἐπεὶ γε* clause becomes a sort of anacoluthic parenthesis.

But why am I thus painfully explicit? Because I find little agreement among the interpreters of the passage, and one of the greatest seems to me to have gone farthest astray. In Professor Wilamowitz' *Aristoteles und Athen*, II, 10, the words are translated as follows: "da ersinnen sie etwas, worin ich nur die kolossalste Naivetät finden kann, die ich kenne. In der Tat, die Barbaren müssen sich schon früher von den Hellenen darin unterschieden haben, dass sie gewitziger und freier von kindischer Einfalt